Thursday, 27 June 2019

Finally, a real collaboration between industrial IoT and enterprise Wi-Fi

"HPE announces the integration of ABB Ability™ Smart Sensor technology with Aruba access points from end of 2019."

Included in HPE's news release on Tuesday, June 18 2019 was an announcement of a new Intelligent Edge partnership with ABB: the 130-year old Swiss industrial equipment manufacturer.

ABB Motor Sensor
Motor Sensor. Photo from ABB catalogue
Integrations like this, in addition to the recently released SES-Imagotag Electronic Shelf Labels integration, are helping to differentiate Aruba products as IoT-friendly in a competitive market.

SES-imagotag electronic shelf label. Image from

The ABB integration is part of a suite of so-called "turnkey edge-to-cloud" solutions for Industy 4.0, which also includes cool toys like an IP55-rated enclosure announced in 2018 called the "Secure Edge Data Center", that can be installed nearer to the factory floor for handling all those time-sensitive operational workloads.

Back to the sensors: ABB has an existing sensor platform called ABB Ability Smart Sensors.
(The sensor capabilities are detailed at the end of this post.)

In the ABB Ability platform without Aruba APs, the sensors communicate over Bluetooth either to a phone within 1-10 meters, or to a ABB-supplied Bluetooth gateway within 50 meters (best case). From there, the information is sent to a cloud service which plots historical data onto graphs, shows lovely red icons when a sensor is alerting, etc.

While the details of the Aruba integration have not yet been announced, it is fair to assume that the BLE radios that have been included in the 300-series and 500-series Aruba APs will be put to use to replace the "gateway every 50 meters" functionality.

If it works anything like the aforementioned SES-Imagotag ESL integration, we can expect to be able to deploy it with a few simple lines of configuration that will allow the AP to bridge the BLE sensors to ABB's cloud servers.
While SES-Imagotag requires a USB dongle, I am hopeful that the ABB solution will be native, as it uses standard BLE.

European organisations can purchase directly from ABB online and the store page reveals subscription pricing of €99.00/device/year with their native gateways. There probably won't be any cost from the Aruba side though.

ABB Bearing Sensor
Bearing Sensor. Photo from ABB catalogue

The sensor portfolio includes:

Condition monitoring for pumps to get readings for:

  • Health parameters
    • Overall condition
    • Overall vibration (velocity rms)
    • Bearing condition
    • Misalignment
    • Unbalance
    • Looseness
    • Blade problems
    • Cavitation (under development)
    • Flow turbulence (under development)
    • Skin temperature (degrees)
  • Operating parameters
    • Radial vibration (velocity rms)
    • Tangential vibration (velocity rms)
    • Axial vibration (velocity rms)
    • Speed (rpm)
    • Operating hours
    • Number of starts

Mounted bearing sensors to get readings for:

  • Temperature
  • Vibration
  • with a traffic-light health dashboard visible in smartphone app

Low voltage motor sensors to get readings for

  • Health parameters
    • Overall condition
    • Overall vibration (velocity rms)
    • Bearing condition
    • Misalignment
    • Skin temperature (degrees)
  • Operating parameters
    • Radial vibration (velocity rms)
    • Tangential vibration (velocity rms)
    • Axial vibration (velocity rms)
    • Speed (rpm)
    • Operating hours
    • Number of starts
    • Supply frequency (Hz)
    • Output power (hp/kW)
    • Regreasing count-down

Wednesday, 12 June 2019

Guide to 5GHz Wi-Fi Channels in New Zealand (NZ)

Disclaimer: I am not a registered RF Engineer, and this is just my interpretation of the information. You are responsible for ensuring your own compliance with Radio Spectrum Management

Most web searches for information about 5GHz Wi-Fi channels result in America-centric or Euro-centric results, so I've compiled this post for New Zealand specific information.

This information was sourced from and from the NZ Government Gazette Radiocommunications Regulations (General User Radio Licence for Short Range Devices) Notice 2019 of April 2019. The regulations therefore may have changed since the 2017 version that is referenced on Wikipedia's list of WLAN channels

You should be aware that ground weather radar, covering channels 114, 118, 120, 122, 124, 126 and 128, operates at nine locations across New Zealand. These being Kaeo, Tamahunga, Mamaku, New Plymouth airport, Mahia, Outlook Hill (Wellington), Rakaia Trig, Blue Spur Range (Hokitika) and Invercargill Airport. If 5GHz Wi-Fi equipment is to be deployed in the vicinity of these 9 locations, it is highly recommended that these channels be avoided, as the weather radar is licenced for protection from interference. If your equipment causes any problems to these licenced services, compliance action may be taken against you.

Ch36 to Ch48 (Ch50/)

5150MHz to 5250MHz
Max EIRP -7.0dBW
Use is limited to wireless LAN indoor systems only.
In the band 5150 – 5250 MHz, the maximum power is −7 dBW (200 mW) e.i.r.p. and the maximum permitted power spectral density is −20 dBW/MHz (10 mW/MHz) e.i.r.p. or equivalently −36 dBW/25 kHz (0.25 mW/25 kHz) e.i.r.p.

Ch52 to Ch64 (/Ch50)

5250MHz to 5350MHz
MAx EIRP -7dBW or 0dBW (depending on Indoor or Outdoor usage)
Use is limited to wireless LAN.
Indoor-Only Systems: In the band 5250 – 5350 MHz, the maximum power is −7 dBW (200 mW) e.i.r.p. and the maximum permitted power spectral density is −20 dBW/MHz (10 mW/MHz) e.i.r.p., provided Dynamic Frequency Selection and Transmitter Power Control are implemented. If Transmitter Power Control is not used, then the maximum power (e.i.r.p.) value must be reduced by 3 dB;
Indoor and Outdoor Systems: In the band 5250 – 5350 MHz, the maximum power is 0 dBW (1 W) e.i.r.p. and the maximum permitted power spectral density is −13 dBW/MHz (50 mW/MHz) e.i.r.p., provided Dynamic Frequency Selection and Transmitter Power Control are implemented in conjunction with the following vertical radiation angle mask where θ is the angle above the local horizontal plane (of the Earth):

Maximum permitted mean power density

Elevation angle above horizontal

−13 dB(W/MHz)

for 0° ≤θ <8°

−13 - 0.716(θ - 8) dB(W/MHz)

for 8° ≤θ <40°

−35.9 - 1.22(θ - 40) dB(W/MHz)

for 40° ≤θ ≤45°

−42 dB(W/MHz)

for 45° <θ;

Ch96 (actually Ch100) to Ch144

We must not implement Ch96, typically we begin at Ch100 for Wi-Fi, but the document does specify that this piece of spectrum begins at 5470MHz which is Ch96.

5470MHz to 5725MHz
Use is limited to wireless LAN
In the band 5470 – 5725 MHz, the transmitter peak power must not exceed −6 dBW (250 mW). The maximum power is 0 dBW (1 W) e.i.r.p. and the maximum permitted power spectral density is −13 dBW/MHz (50 mW/MHz) e.i.r.p., provided Dynamic Frequency Selection and Transmitter Power Control are implemented. If Transmitter Power Control is not used, then the maximum power (e.i.r.p.) value must be reduced by 3 dB.

Ch149 to Ch169 (actually Ch168)

The published frequency range includes Ch169, but we must not use Ch169 in New Zealand.

5725MHz to 5850MHz
Max EIRP 23 dBW
In the band 5725 – 5850 MHz, the transmitter peak power must not exceed 0 dBW (1 W) and the power spectral density must not exceed 17 dBm/MHz. The maximum power of any emission must not exceed 23 dBW (e.i.r.p.). Transmission is permitted from customer premise equipment with integrated antenna that is part of a point-to-multipoint system receiving from and transmitting to a central access point.

It is interesting to note that the RSM boundaries fall on the centre frequencies of wide Wi-Fi channels, meaning that the upper and lower halves of the channel may have different regulations. I invite any commenters to clarify this.

This diagram sets out the Wi-Fi channels that you can and can’t use in New Zealand.
and here is a static image in case that link becomes unavailable:

Aruba Outdoor AP Mounting Bracket Photos

These are the 4 outdoor AP mounting brackets for Aruba AP 270 series, 360 series, 370 series 275, 365, 367, 374, 377, 374, 380

MNT-H1 - JW054A - Hanging install (can tilt)
MNT- H2 - JW055A - Hanging install (flush, cannot tilt)
MNT-V1 - JW052A - Long arm pole/wall mount (300mm from wall)
MNT-V2 - JW053A - Short arm pole/wall mount (75mm from wall)

Important: If using AP377 or AP387 or other directional AP, don't use the wall mount or you'll end up aiming the antennas at the floor! Rather use the MNT-H1 mount on a wall or pole.

All will become clear when you see the photos:

Thursday, 11 April 2019

Dragonblood: Should you worry? (Wi-Fi WPA3 security vulnerabilities explained for the not-so-techie)

On 10 April 2019 I noticed a flurry of panicky news stories and posts around LinkedIn and Twitter. The Wi-Fi Alliance published a security update regarding security vulnerabilities in the new WPA3 Wi-Fi standards which WLAN vendors are expected to start rolling out en masse in 2019.

The WPA3 standards promised a far more secure environment than the aging WPA2 standards currently in use just about everywhere today. The vulnerabilities (named Dragonblood) already have their own webpage, logo, theme song, etc. so we know that non-technical company execs will be seeing this across their feeds and demanding information about the security of the million-dollar Wi-Fi refresh they've just paid for, by the end of the week.

Before we engage in mass hysteria, let's examine the vulnerabilities a little further and see if there is truly anything to worry about.

Is this report from a reputable source?
Yes! The analysis and POC code were written by Mathy Vanhoef (NYUAD) and Eyal Ronen (Tel Aviv University & KU Leuven). Vanhoef had also discovered the Krack attack vulnerabilites that got everyone worried in 2017.

Why "Dragonblood"?
It is trendy for vulnerabilities to be given catchy names as this makes it easier for them to be written about in the media and go viral. These vulnerabilities are mainly around the handshake key exchange mechanism used in WPA3 which is called Dragonfly, hence the analysis paper was titled Dragonblood. The researchers released 4 tools to demonstrate the specific attacks and named them Dragonslayer, Dragondrain, Dragontime, and Dragonforce.
Note that the Dragonfly family of handshakes is not only used in Wi-Fi. Other encryption-based systems could also be vulnerable.

Can the Dragonblood vulnerabilities be fixed?
Yes, mostly.
Thanks to the researchers' responsible disclosure of the vulnerabilities, major vendors already had patches in place or in the works before the public announcement was made. simply ensuring that the firmware on your network equipment is kept up to date is sufficient to mitigate or remediate against most of these vulnerabilities. (this is why it is important to use trusted brands and keep those support contracts up to date folks).
In at least one of the downgrade attack scenarios (explained in more detail later on), a device is tricked into connecting to a WPA2 network and then a WPA2 exploit is used. This can't be easily fixed but it isn't strictly a WPA3 exploit either.
Unless you're 100% in control of every device connecting to your network (and who is?), you can't update the client side devices. The good news here is that hardly any WPA3 client devices are released yet, so hopefully most will be fixed before anyone even buys them.

Cisco has already released a statement by the reputable Jerome Henry, saying "Cisco Access points are not affected by any of the vulnerabilities described. The Cisco AireOS and IOS-XE releases that support SAE for WPA3-Personal will also include protection mechanisms against these vulnerabilities. WPA3 clients may need to be updated and Cisco recommends finding the latest information from vendors’ websites."

I will update this page with statements from other vendors as they become available. Personally I'm looking forward seeing a comment from Dan Harkins, the computer scientist who wrote Dragonfly and EAP-pwd, and currently happens to be employed by Aruba Networks.

In summary: The sky isn't falling, keep your network devices up to date, keep your client devices up to date.

You can find more detail about the individual tools below.

From the readme: This is an experimental tool to test EAP-pwd implementations for vulnerabilities. We also strongly recommend to perform code inspections to assure all vulnerabilities have been properly addressed.

Should you worry?
Virtually nobody is using EAP-pwd in their Wi-Fi networks. It is rarely even presented as an option. Unless your job involves actually building Wi-Fi devices, you don't need to worry about this.

From the readme: The Dragondrain tool forges Commit messages to cause a high CPU usage on the target. This can for example be used to drain the battery of a device, or more generally to drain and exhaust resources.

The name is a play on the fact that this is a 'clogging' attack.

Should you worry?
Not if you keep your network devices up to date.
It is a denial-of-service attack. The authors have already given the solution to the vendors to implement i.e. use a dedicated, low-priority CPU thread to run this task so that the entire CPU can never be impacted.

From the readme: This is an experimental tool to carry out timing attacks against WPA3's SAE handshake. It was created to carry out attacks, not to detect whether an implementation is vulnerable in the first place. It was used to carry out the timing attack against MODP groups 22 and 24 as described in the Dragonblood paper.

This vulnerability actually has a CVE allocation: CVE-2019-9494

Should you worry?
Not too much.
You don't need to know what MODP (Modular Exponential) groups are, just that they are options implemented in cryptographic algorithms. Three groups have been identified here as being vulnerable while another three groups are suggested to be avoided. This can be fixed in a software patch that simply removes those groups as options (that is if the groups were ever used in the first place - according to the paper there were already known issues since 2017 with these groups, so they should have been avoided all along). The authors even state this "Note that most WPA3 implementations by default do not enable these groups"

This is the tool that takes the information from the other tools and runs something similar to a dictionary attack to retrieve the keys.

What about that 'downgrade attack' mentioned earlier?
It is really difficult to move 20 years' worth of devices to a new encryption scheme, so the WPA3 standard allows for a compatibility mode, or transition mode, of operation where the network will simultaneously support WPA2 and WPA3. The attack in this case involves setting up an 'evil twin' SSID using only WPA2 and the client device connects to it because it knows that WPA2 is still permitted. WPA2 vulnerabilities are then leveraged to discover the keys.

Should you worry?
No more than you worried yesterday about your WPA2 networks.
The fix for this needs to come from the manufacturers of client devices. Samsung, Apple, Lenovo, etc. 
As a network operator you can run WIDS/WIPS to guard against this type of attack.

I'm having trouble sleeping at night, where can I find the full paper?
The full paper has been published at

Sunday, 25 November 2018

How To: Upgrade Aruba Airwave


This post will answer the following 3 questions:

  1. How to upgrade Aruba Airwave Server?
  2. How long does it take to upgrade Aruba Airwave?
  3. What type and duration of outage can be expected during the upgrade of Aruba Airwave?
The example below shows the actual output from a real upgrade of AMP from version 8.5 to version in a single server environment (no Glass). This specific server is a virtual appliance hosted on Hyper-V.

As Network administrators we are used to upgrades of firmware on a switch, router or WLC taking a few minutes at the most. When it comes time to upgrade the server software we use, we can be caught off-guard by the lengthy amount of time required and it is unclear when any outage will occur. To help with understanding the process I present to you an annotated output of the upgrade process, including timings.

System Output


    System output
    My input
    My annotations
    Outage information

Before starting the backup, download the nightly backup file from the web GUI to a safe location.

T = time of initial login to CLI

login as: ampadmin
Authorised access only. Managed by xyzabc.
ampadmin@server's password:
Last login: Fri Sep 14 13:49:46 2018 from server
Loading Menu...

AirWave Management Platform 8.2.5 on servername
  1  Upload File
  2  Download File
  3  Delete File
  4  Backup
  5  Restore
  6  Support
  7  Upgrade
  8  Advanced
  9  Security
10  Custom Commands
  q  >> Quit
Your choice: 7
  1  Upgrade AirWave Management Platform
  2  Upgrade OS Kernel
  b  >> Back
Your choice: 1

Running Upgrade AirWave Management Platform

AMP version:
Running [/usr/local/airwave/bin/start_amp_upgrade -f /var/ampcli/user -v]...
Upgrade script AMP- was not found in local cache.
Upgrade package AMP- was not found in local cache.

Upgrade package will be downloaded from the internet...
Do you use proxy server? (y/N): N

Download upgrade package from:
    1. Aruba Support Portal
    2. HPE My Networking Portal
Enter your choice (1 or 2): 1

Preparing to connect to Aruba Support Portal...
Enter your Aruba Support Portal username: USERNAMEgoesHERE/PW Prompt not shown
######################################################################## 100.0%
Upgrade package AMP- was not found in local cache.

Checking iptables.

T + 2 minutes

Checking the database schema.

T + 5 minutes

Preparing to connect to Aruba Support Portal...

T + 20 minutes (the progress bar stays on a single line unless you hit enter)

##########################                                                36.9%

T + 32 minutes (this part takes a while)

##########################################################                81.1%

T + 40 minutes (phew, finally)

######################################################################## 100.0%
Validating the upgrade package...
Verifying authenticity of the upgrade package....
Verifying signature....
Good Signature....
Verifying checksum....
Upgrade package verified....
Upgrading AMP to version from version 8.2.5...
Detailed log will be written to /var/log/upgrade/AMP-

STEP 1: Moving old version aside.

STEP 2: Unpacking upgrade package.

STEP 3: Checking for compatibility.

T + 45 minutes

STEP 4: Stopping AMP services

T + 46 minutes
46 minutes after starting the upgrade, Airwave Application is unavailable. 
The Airwave server itself is still up and responding to ICMP monitoring, and for some time also HTTP monitoring.
As shown in the screenshot below: the browser which was displaying Airwave GUI is still reachable but shows a 502 error in the frame.

STEP 5: Installing upgrade.
T + 55 minutes. Still installing the upgrade. Waiting patiently. No useful feedback on terminal.

Updated kernel packages that fix various security issues are now
available for your OS. To upgrade, select 'Upgrade' menu item on the AMPCLI Menu,
and then choose 'Upgrade OS Kernel' menu item.

For more information refer to the security advisory:


T + 57 minutes. Upgrade complete

STEP 6: Restarting AMP services.
Post upgrade schema check is in progress..
This may take a few minutes..

T + 59 minutes.
Services are back up (verify by logging in to web GUI). 13 minutes of actual application outage time so far, and server stayed up the entire time. 😏

But wait! There was a prompt to also upgrade the OS Kernel. Looks like we're in for a full reboot after all. 😫.

Upgrade from 8.2.5 to is successful.
Hit <enter> to continue
Hit enter to continue, 's' to show output, 'r' to show return code.
  1  Upgrade AirWave Management Platform
  2  Upgrade OS Kernel
  b  >> Back

Your choice: 2

T + 1 hour 02 minutes

Running Upgrade OS Kernel

A newer version of the kernel is available.  If you choose to upgrade
you will need to reboot the system for the change to take effect.
Upgrade the kernel? (y/N) y
Preparing...                ########################################### [100%]
   1:kernel-firmware        ########################################### [ 33%]
   2:kernel                 ########################################### [ 67%]
   3:kernel-headers         ########################################### [100%]
The kernel has been upgraded successfully.

T + 1 hour 04 minutes. (wow that kernel upgrade was really quick compared to the application upgrade)

Reboot now? (y/N) y
Are you sure? (y/N) y

Broadcast message from ampadmin@servername
        (/dev/pts/0) at 10:44 ...

The system is going down for reboot NOW!

Hit enter to continue, 's' to show output, 'r' to show return code.
<end of output>

At this point the server reboots and the SSH session is lost. Now the server is hard down.

T + 1 hour 07 minutes

The server is back up after only a couple of minutes. The services will take some time to start up.

T + 1 hour 10 minutes 

Done! The application is back up and running and verified.


The Airwave upgrade process is heavily scripted by Aruba and doesn't need much interaction after starting the upgrade. In fact I only touched the keyboard a handful of times and mostly for y/n input. The upgrade does always take a lot longer than I expect which I why I decided to document it this time.

There were 2 outages: 13 minutes while the application upgraded and another of 6 minutes for the OS reboot.

Despite the fact that I had allocated a 1 hour outage window for this change (which I thought was overly generous at the time, ha), I ran over the window with the second part of the outage actually falling outside of that window, ouch.

Other factors that could possibly impact the upgrade duration are the size of the database and the specs of the VM resources allocated.

Note that the application can be upgraded by firstly downloading the file from Aruba or HPE website then uploading locally to Airwave, then starting the process. I have not yet timed that method.

Note also that the RHEL kernel can be upgraded at any time from the AMPCLI menu, it does not need to happen as part of the application upgrade.

Friday, 12 October 2018

How To: Using ArubaOS8 API with PowerShell


This guide explains:
  • the basics of the ArubaOS8 API, 
  • specifics of interacting with the ArubaOS8 API when using PowerShell, 
  • some general quirks regarding PowerShell usage common to this and other API services 

HPE Aruba's AOS8, starting with v8.0.0, includes a powerful web API which provides both GET and SET capabilities, and also the ability to run show commands which returns structured JSON.

Aruba has published API documentation, which is available from the support site (API PDF).

What struck me with this, as with many API guides, is that the examples are shown only with cURL. I work in and with Windows-centric organisations and I really need to see examples using PowerShell, so I've gone through the guide and selected a few commands to recreate in PowerShell.

Some notes before we begin:

  1. On my test device I have a self-signed certificate. If I were using cURL then I could simply use the --insecure flag to skip the certificate check. There is no equivalent switch on PowerShell's Invoke-WebRequest/Invoke-RestMethod commands. I use the method described in the comments of this Stackoverflow page as a workaround. If anyone knows an easier way, please let me know in the comments.
  2. All examples below are based on standalone Mobility Controller. A slight variation to the URI is required when connecting to a Mobility Master environment. This is explained clearly in the API docs.
  3. A dedicated API local user account with read-only privileges has been configured on the standalone controller.
  4. Variables $t1, $t2, $t3 etc. are just variables I use to keep my example outputs separate from one another, as opposed to my other favourite method of calling everything $test ;)
Important disclaimer: I do not claim to be an expert in scripting PowerShell or any other language. At best I'm a tinkerer who can hack enough code together to make my own life easier. Anything copied from here is used at your own risk.

Step 1: Set up some reusable objects

#Set variables

$WLC_IP = ''
$API_BASE_URI = 'https://'+$WLC_IP+':4343/v1'
$DeviceUsername = "apiuser"
$DevicePassword = "supersecretpassword"

  • We've defined the IP address of the AOS8 device. We could also use the FQDN here.
  • We've used that IP/FQDN to build a string that will be used in every call.
  • We've defined the username and password of the account mentioned in Note 3

Step 2: Run the self-signed certificate workaround

EDIT 13-Oct-18: From Powershell v6 and above (Powershell Core), we now have a new
-SkipCertificateCheck flag available on Invoke-WebRequest and Invoke-RestMethod, so this step can be skipped. This is great news for lab work with self-signed certs. Remember that this is not a substitute for installing a proper cert.
  • There are also several other methods to be found with a web search
  • As described in Note 1. That StackOverflow link again
  • This is only required once per session, but for convenience I save it as a separate .ps script and leave a reference to it in my script, and it runs every time.
  • Recommendations for better methods are welcome. Of course the best method is to have a proper TLS certificate installed on the device :)
if (-not("dummy" -as [type])) {
    add-type -TypeDefinition @"
using System;
using System.Net;
using System.Net.Security;
using System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates;

public static class Dummy {
    public static bool ReturnTrue(object sender,
        X509Certificate certificate,
        X509Chain chain,
        SslPolicyErrors sslPolicyErrors) { return true; }

    public static RemoteCertificateValidationCallback GetDelegate() {
        return new RemoteCertificateValidationCallback(Dummy.ReturnTrue);

[System.Net.ServicePointManager]::ServerCertificateValidationCallback = [dummy]::GetDelegate()

Step 3: Log in to the device

#Login to device using previously defined variables
$session = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "${API_BASE_URI}/api/login" -Method Post -Body "username=$DeviceUsername&password=$DevicePassword" -SessionVariable api_session

  • This result of this entire Invoke-RestMethod call will be JSON saved into a variable named $session.
  • Take special note of the part at the end where we declared a Session Variable and named it "api_session". We'll be referencing that variable again in every step to follow. This is how PowerShell keeps track of all our web sessions.
Here is what the $session data looks like:
@{status=0; status_str=You've logged in successfully.; UIDARUBA=6cd9028f-f3ea-434d-b3ac-a13385537b0fad}

and here is what the $api_session created on my machine looks like:

Headers               : {}
Cookies               : System.Net.CookieContainer
UseDefaultCredentials : False
Credentials           : 
Certificates          : 
UserAgent             : Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT; Windows NT 10.0; en-NZ) WindowsPowerShell/5.1.15063.1209
Proxy                 : 
MaximumRedirection    : -1

Step 4: Obtain the UID key and save it for future use

The JSON response of $session data from the previous step can now be interrogated for the security cookie needed for subsequent queries.

#get the UID key session cookie from the login response
$UIDARUBA = $session._global_result.UIDARUBA

We now have an authenticated session, with a cookie. We can now proceed to do stuff!

Step 5: Containers and Objects (complete lists)

Explaining in detail what Containers and Objects do is best left to the formal documentation.
To briefly summarise: We can run a GET against either a Container or an Object. Containers are around a dozen or so groups of objects categories. Objects are specific items, with over 1000 available for query.

  • Note how the $API_BASE_URI, the $api_session, and the $UIDARUBA variables all come together now...

#Get complete List of Containers
$t1 = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "${API_BASE_URI}/configuration/container?UIDARUBA=$UIDARUBA" -Method Get -WebSession $api_session

Get complete List of Objects (may take many seconds to run)
$t2 = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "${API_BASE_URI}/configuration/object?UIDARUBA=$UIDARUBA" -Method Get -WebSession $api_session

There are way too many Containers and Objects to show here, but I'll show you a snippet of my list:


WAN               : @{name=WAN; help=Compression, Health Check, Uplink                                       Management}
LoadBal-Redun     : @{name=Load Balancing & Redundancy; help=Clustering, High Availability, VRRP}
WLAN              : @{name=Wireless LAN; help=AP Group, Client Match, Hotspot, IDS,                                       Mcell, Mesh, Mobility, RF, SSID,                           
                                Virtual AP}
Services          : @{name=Services; help=ALE, Airgroup, Lync, Openflow, SDN}
AP-Provisioning   : @{name=AP Provisioning; help=AP Provisioning, AP Whitelist,                                       Provisioning Profile}
Unknown           : @{name=Unknown; help=Fix these objects, catchall container}
Interfaces        : @{name=Interfaces; help=Physical/Logical/Loopback Interfaces,                                       Tunnels and USB/Modem Interfaces}


      "arm_error_rate_threshold": {
        "error-rate-threshold": {
          "_min": 0, 
          "_type": "INT", 
          "_max": 100, 
          "_default_val": 70, 
          "_help": "% min rate for error in channel that triggers a channel change. Default 70. Recommended value 70"
      "arm_error_rate_wait_time": {
        "error-rate-wait-time": {
          "_min": 0, 
          "_type": "INT", 
          "_max": 2147483647, 
          "_default_val": 90, 
          "_help": "Minimum time in seconds error rate has to be high to trigger a channel change. Default: 90."
      "channel_quality_aware_arm": {}, 
      "arm_channel_quality_threshold": {
        "channel-quality-threshold": {
          "_min": 0, 
          "_type": "INT", 
          "_max": 100, 
          "_default_val": 70, 
          "_help": "Channel quality below which triggers a channel change. Default 70%."

We now have the complete lists of Containers and Objects. Educational but not very useful in itself, so on to the next step.

Step 6: Some specific examples of Containers

We've seen the list of all containers, now lets get a couple of specific containers and extract some specific information from them

#Get Info of specific Container (example: Interfaces)
$t3 = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "${API_BASE_URI}/configuration/container/Interfaces?UIDARUBA=$UIDARUBA" -Method Get -WebSession $api_session

#Get Info of specific Container (example: Crypto)
$t4 = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "${API_BASE_URI}/configuration/container/Crypto?UIDARUBA=$UIDARUBA" -Method Get -WebSession $api_session

  • We've grabbed all the info from the Interfaces container
  • We've grabbed all the info from the Crypto container
  • Woohoo, now we are getting some useful data about our device!
Let's check that Interfaces JSON for VLAN info:

#Example: show VLAN Names

Here is the VLAN info on my system:
name              vlan-ids
----              --------
Corp-SSID           241     
BYOD-SSID        244     
Guest-Legacy       100     
Corp-Legacy        28      
Guest-SSID          242     
FrontageMain       20 

Step 7: Some specific examples of Objects (with optional filtering)

Note: The syntax for filtering can get a little complicated, please refer to the full API documentation for details on that.

#Get Info of specific Objects (example: Int VLAN)
$t5 = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "${API_BASE_URI}/configuration/object/int_vlan?UIDARUBA=$UIDARUBA" -Method Get -WebSession $api_session

#Get Info of specific Objects with filter (example: Int VLAN, filter IP addr and MTU)
#URI Needs a bit of massaging due to so many nested quotation marks. There is definitely a better way to do this!
$t6uri1 = '/configuration/object/int_vlan?&filter=[ {"OBJECT" : { "$eq" : ["int_vlan.int_vlan_ip", "int_vlan.int_vlan_mtu"] } }  ]&'
$t6uri2 = "${API_BASE_URI}${t6uri1}"
$t6 = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "${t6uri2}UIDARUBA=$UIDARUBA" -Method Get -WebSession $api_session

We can compare the responses and clearly see that the filtering is effective:
PS C:\> $t5._data

{@{id=1; int_vlan_shut=; int_vlan_routing=; int_vlan_ndra_hlimit=; int_vlan_ndra_interval=; int_vlan_ndra_ltime=; int_vlan_ndra_mtu=; int_vlan_nd_reachtime=; int_vlan_nd_rtrans_t...

PS C:\> $t6._data

{@{id=1; int_vlan_mtu=}, @{id=20; int_vlan_ip=; int_vlan_mtu=}, @{id=240; int_vlan_ip=; int_vlan_mtu=}, @{id=241; int_vlan_mtu=}...}

There is a bunch of info available about the interfaces. Next we use regular PowerShell syntax to view the one or all interfaces:

PS C:\> $t5._data.int_vlan[1]

id                              : 20
int_vlan_ip                     : @{ipaddr=; ipparams=ipaddrmask; ipmask=}
int_vlan_routing                : @{_present=True; _flags=}
int_vlan_ndra_hlimit            : @{_flags=; value=64}
int_vlan_ndra_interval          : @{_flags=; value=600}
int_vlan_ndra_ltime             : @{_flags=; value=1800}
int_vlan_ndra_mtu               : @{_flags=; value=1500}
int_vlan_nd_reachtime           : @{_flags=; value=0}
int_vlan_nd_rtrans_time         : @{_flags=; value=0}
int_vlan_mtu                    : @{_flags=; value=1500}
int_vlan_suppress_arp           : @{_present=True; _flags=}
int_vlan_ip_ospf_cost           : @{_flags=; value=1}
int_vlan_ip_ospf_dead_interval  : @{_flags=; value=40}
int_vlan_ip_ospf_hello_interval : @{_flags=; value=10}
int_vlan_ip_ospf_prior          : @{_flags=; value=1}
int_vlan_ip_ospf_retransmit_int : @{_flags=; value=5}
int_vlan_ip_ospf_transmit_delay : @{_flags=; value=1}

Let's finally see some IP addresses of this box:

#Example: show int VLAN IP from unfiltered response

PS C:\> $t5._data.int_vlan[1].int_vlan_ip

ipaddr        ipparams   ipmask       
------        --------   ------   ipaddrmask

#Example: show int VLAN IP from filtered response

PS C:\> $t6._data.int_vlan[1].int_vlan_ip

ipaddr        ipparams   ipmask       
------        --------   ------   ipaddrmask

Step 8: Running any 'Show' command

A neat feature of this API is the ability to run any show command, and get the result in a somewhat more structured format than a simple screen-scrape. 
Here is how that looks:

#Running any show command (example: 'show iap table')
$t7 = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "${API_BASE_URI}/configuration/showcommand?command=show+iap+table&UIDARUBA=$UIDARUBA" -Method Get -WebSession $api_session
#Example: show Up/Down branches
#Example: show the table data
$t7.'IAP Branch Table'

We've now got two forms of data about the 'show iap table' command we sent.
Viewing $t7._data gives us:

PS C:\> $t7._data
Trusted Branch Validation: Disabled
Total No of UP Branches   : 2
Total No of DOWN Branches : 0
Total No of Branches      : 2

While viewing $t7.'IAP Branch Table' gives us:

PS C:\> $t7.'IAP Branch Table'

Assigned Subnet : 
Assigned Vlan   : 242,244
Inner IP        :
Name            : SiteA-VC
Status          : UP
VC MAC Address  : 20:a6:cd:aa:bb:cc

Assigned Subnet : 
Assigned Vlan   : 242,244
Inner IP        :
Name            : SiteB-VC
Status          : UP
VC MAC Address  : 20:a6:cd:dd:ee:ff

What if we just want the status of the SiteB tunnel? Then we simply use $t7.'IAP Branch Table'[1].Status which gives us:

PS C:\> $t7.'IAP Branch Table'[1].Status

Step 9: Logging out

Practice good hygiene. Always remember to log out!

Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "${API_BASE_URI}/api/logout"  -WebSession $api_session

The device replies with a friendly message confirming the log out:

@{status=0; status_str=You've been logged out successfully.; UIDARUBA=(null)}

  • Note that the structure of the logout command is different to that of the GET requests, and the UIDARUBA security cookie is not required.


These have been a few examples of API GET requests using the AurbaOS8 API and PowerShell. 

There is plenty more that can be done with the same API e.g. SET operations, counts, special pagination, viewing pending vs actual data, adding users, a special 'write mem' object, and more. Once again, refer to the officially published API docs and explore the Objects catalogue to understand the full feature set available.

I hope this information has been useful to my fellow PowerShell users. I have already put it into practice for monitoring a specific item that has no SNMP OID attached.

Please leave your comments below.